




































JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY-4TH-EDITION (AQUINO)-2022


Abstract: 

This paper problematises the definition challenge for African philosophy and attempts an 
analytical reconceptualization of African Philosophy. Attempts will thus be made to 
examine some of the approaches bothering on the ideation and definition of African 
Philosophy. The aim of such examination is to show that these approaches or discernible 
senses of African Philosophy are influenced by the tripartite factors of identity, method, 
and relevance. The view of this paper is that an exposition of the various senses of African 
Philosophy vis-à-vis the tripartite factors is essential for the conceptualization of a 
working definition of African Philosophy based on the complementary interplay of the 
subjective and objective dimension of philosophy. This analytical reconceptualization 
enhances the frontiers of African philosophy to be more opens in meeting the 
contemporary demand for Africa's development in the age globalization. 

Keywords: African Philosophy, Tripartite Challenges, Objective dimensions, Subjective 
Dimensions, 

Introduction 
Conceptualizing African philosophy is apt for any philosophical discourse on African 
existential challenges, i.e., Poverty, human depravity, political instability, environmental 
degradation, civil unrest, illegal migration, and many more. This is in lieu of the fact that 
such discourse will be a genre of an applied philosophy from an African parlance to 
solving the lived challenges of the continent. It is therefore imperative that the discussion 
concerning the quest for panacea to contemporary challenges in Africa be situated within 
the broader perspectives of African Philosophy. Hence, its conceptualization. A caveat to 
note, however, is that the attempt at conceptualizing African Philosophy is not an 
apologia of the existence of African philosophy. Rather, it gives a justification for 
explaining the part-whole relationship between applied philosophy and philosophy from 
an African perspective. In other words, conceptualizing African philosophy would lend 
us an intellectual framework to explore an African lens through which to evaluate 
contemporary existential challenges. This paper thus embarks on an analytical 
reconceptualization of African philosophy to reposition it towards being more enhanced 
in handling perennial challenges. 
The first part of the paper considers the background to define African Philosophy and 
identifies the three main discernible senses or approaches on the field. Afterwards, effort 
will be made to highlight the tripartite challenges to defining African philosophy. It must 

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RE-CONCEPTUALISING AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AS DEVELOPMENTAL 
TOOL IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION.

Akinpelu A. OYEKUNLE, Ph.D



be noted that these three challenges of identity, method and relevance form the fulcrum of 
guides that undergird the various approaches towards defining African philosophy. The 
paper aims to argue that to conceptualize African Philosophy in a manner that it will be fit 
to address practical issues of reality in the continent is to see the effort in the light of the 
tripartite factors. Doing so is to see African philosophy as a veritable tool in the critical 
exploration of the social constructions of answers to the existential questions of the 
continent. To this end, the section that follows will be considering defining African 
Philosophy as a tool for answering the contemporary existential questions, albeit in a 
manner that recognizes the participatory stance of the continent in the global arena. This 
informs the consideration of the subjective dimensions of philosophy. The paper 
concludes that, African Philosophy in the attempt to grapple with the nuances of the 
tripartite factors of definition can be conceptualize on a part-whole relationship between 
operating in a particular context-oriented form (subjective) and grounding such 
operations on a general dimension of life realities (objective). 

An Overview of Some 'Approaches'
While the paper, may not go into the old debate of the existence or otherwise of African 
Philosophy, however, attempt will be made to explore some attempts at ideating 'African 
Philosophy'. I elect not to enter this debate based on the varying understanding of 
renowned African scholars such as Kwasi Wiredu, ; Paul O. Bodunrin , ; Odera Oruka ; 
Kwame Gyekye , ; Sophie B. Oluwole , , ; Mogobe Ramose ; Moses A. Makinde ; 
Olusegun Oladipo ; Doyo Guyo ; Emmanuel Chukwudo-Eze  Pascah Mungwini  who 
have held that African Philosophy exists. In fact, Samuel Imbo highlighted three 
discernible senses of extant African Philosophy as “ethnophilosophical, universalist and 
hermeneutical approaches” , which will now be considered. 

It should be note at this juncture that this paper is not oblivious of the many trends in 
African philosophy as opined by Oruka : Ethnophilosophy; Philosophic Sagacity; 
Nationalist-Ideological Philosophy; Professional African Philosophy; Literary-artistic 
Philosophy and Hermeneutical theory in African Philosophy and later by Wiredu : 
Traditional African Philosophy and Contemporary African Philosophy.One of the 
significant authors in terms of giving a commentary and interpretation of these trends is 
Imbo. The position of Imbo, though summative, is found for our discussion here to be apt 
and comprehensive. Imbo's scheme is adopted because his three discernible senses of 
African philosophy cover all the trends identified by both Oruka and Wiredu; although 
with modification that appears fitting for this paper. It is thus more rational to think that 
within the class of the universalist, for instance, it is not unlikely to have some Nationalist 
ideologists as well as Professional philosophers. Also, ethnophilosophy and professional 
philosophy would well feature in the hermeneutical sense of African philosophy. Imbo 
recognizing the possibility of the interplays and overlapping nature of these individual 
trends thus aptly represented the various trends of African philosophy with the three 
discernible senses: 'ethnophilosophical', 'universalist' and 'hermeneutical' approaches. 
These three discernible senses will now be considered. 

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Ethnophilosophical approach refers to philosophical opinions that are entrenched in 
mythical, religious, linguistic, anthropological as well as poetical worldviews of different 
African cultures. With this view, African Philosophy is to be known by the nuances of the 
unique belief system and ethnocentric concepts such as language, mysticism, magic, 
fables and myths. The ethnophilosophical approach is best seen in the works of Alexis 
Kagame , Leopold Senghor , Placide Tempels , John Mbiti  among others. While one 
would understand the attempts of the ethnophilosophical scholars in situating African 
Philosophy in culturally specific views. Their attempt is owing essentially to the urgency 
of proving wrong, the Eurocentric denial of rationality in Africa. Chief of such Western-
centric thoughts is the Hegelian description of Africa as a continent of savages whose 
thought and life hinges on primitivity, and as such, without history or proper philosophy. 
For Hegel, Africa as a continent. “is unhistorical, undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the 
conditions of nature” . The intellectual reactions against such views like that of Hegel 
culminated into the great debate. However, efforts like the great debate, according to 
Isaac Kapila, only present the continent's cultural homogeneity in a bad light as it shows 
African Philosophy as being incapable “of its own unique and consistent logic” . In other 
words, the great debate presupposes that without the need for the intellectual reactions to 
Eurocentric denial of African rationality, African philosophy may not have been 
developed.

The “Universalist Worldview” begins with the definition of philosophy as an objective 
and universal, principle-laden enterprise. This means that the universalist worldview or 
approach is a stance opposed to the culture-specific method. To the pioneer proponents of 
this view: Innocent Onyewuenyi ; Kwasi Wiredu , ; Peter Bodunrin  and Paulin 
Hountondji . Philosophy is not expected to be culture-dependent. Rather, philosophy is 
considered to be a “systemic and methodological inquiry that should not be altered by its 
geographical application” . For the universalists therefore, intellectual skepticism should 
be cast upon any philosophy that is not written down . As noted by Imbo, to the 
universalist, the ability to develop a “tradition of debate and sustained inquiry” of such 
non-written philosophy would be of great minimal effect.   Although there are 
universalists who give room for oral philosophy–e.g. Henry Odera Oruka, who 
developed the idea of Sagacity–the idea was to present a Socratic-alike person he refers to 
as African Sages in the African parlance . In Kwasi Wiredu (1998b, pp. 19-21), the 
Universalist ideation of African Philosophy is that of a “proper” philosophy of the African 
orientation that includes a critical reconstruction of African traditional thoughts, to reveal 
philosophical elements thereof. 

Philosophers in the hermeneutical approach is out to challenge both ethnophilosophical 
and universalist perspectives. As argued by , the hermeneutical philosophers take African 
traditions as their starting point, as they seek to escape the enslavement to the past by 
critically using that past to open up the future. It is the understanding of these scholars that 
philosophy–suitably construed–must move beyond a preoccupation with ethnological 
considerations and universalist abstraction, by calling into question actual relations of 
power in Africa . The works of Theophilus Okere , , ; Tsenay Serequeberhan , ; Marcien 

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Oyekunle                Re-conceptualising African Philosophy As Developmental Tool ...



Towa ; and Okonda Okolo  exemplify this hermeneutical orientation in African 
Philosophy. The hermeneutic approach inheres in the application of tools of philosophy to 
issues regarding the existential realities of the continents, even in the face of 
globalization. This is in contrast to the ethnophilosophical worldview, which subsists in 
holding “culture specific views” . 

A Tripartite Challenge for Defining African Philosophy
The three challenges that will be discussed in this section are: Identity; Method and 
Relevance. One thing that is to be shown in the consideration of these tripartite challenges 
is that the varying approaches or trends in African philosophy are informed or 
necessitated by the tripartite factors. That is, the tripartite factors provide a unifying 
ground of operation to the varying approaches. In other words, the tripartite challenges 
are factors that inform or necessitate the conception of these approaches. It will thus be 
held here that the characterization of trends for African Philosophy can be identified by 
the attempt at dealing with the intellectual challenges of identity, methodology and 
relevance. To put in another form, the quantum of efforts by philosophers to opine for a 
philosophy that is classified as “African”, could be captioned under their various attempts 
to deal with this tripartite challenge of intellectualism. 

On Identity:Much of the debate that starts the discussion about African Philosophy is 
wired around the quest for African identity, that was set at countering the deniability of 
African philosophy. The quest for identity is given preference more in the need to deal 
with the challenge of refuting thecolonialculturaldenigrationofAfricans andAfrican 
societies. Such colonial induced denigration of colonized culture came with 
theestablishment or Western-centric evaluativeparametersforengaging with the 
Africanbeliefsystems. In the face of such Eurocentric engagements, the crisis of identity 
ensued. Thus, the factor of identity became germane in the canonization of various trends 
of African Philosophy.

On Method:The factor of designating a functional method that would be employable for 
the discipline of African Philosophy is another deciding factor for defining African 
Philosophy. Method sets at answering the question of what to include as the subject of 
discussion; what process of enquiry would be adjudged to be suitable for an intellectual 
engagement; and what research questions would be essential for determining discourse 
that could pass for African Philosophy. 

On Relevance:The quest for relevance is also another deciding factor for characterizing 
philosophy as an authentic African Philosophy. How relevant is the idea put forward in 
addressing the existential challenges of Africa? How relevant is the philosophic 
postulations to the socio-cultural experience of the Africans even in the quest for 
sustainable development and in the face of globalization? The Africancontinent 
isnotonlypeculiar because ofitspredicaments, since there is no segment of humanity 
without its own predicaments. However, the African predicament generates  conceptual  
dynamisms which  ensure  that  any concepts  and   ideas to be applied to the continent 

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must have a unique trajectory that facilitates the twin task of self-definition and 
development. This informs, to a large extent, the imperativeness of the relevance factor. 
The relevance of an idea, theory or concept towards addressing the existential challenges 
of Africa is not only essential for defining African philosophy, but also informs the 
positions of the varying trends or approaches to African Philosophy.

The position of this paper here is that the discipline and practice of African Philosophy is 
better advocated by the engendering factors of identity, methodology, and relevance. This 
position is in the lieu of the fact that, defining African philosophy based on the 
oral/written contention between the ethnophilosophical and universalist approaches 
appears to be a disservice to the discipline of African Philosophy. Such disservice is noted 
by Bruce Janz when he argues that: 

While philosophers maybe willing to admit that philosophy happens in 
social contexts, it still about ideas; while it may happen predominantly 
through texts, it is not reducible to literary theory; while ideas may have 
been used to justify  the power of some over others,  it is not simply 
politics. (Janz, 2009, p. 4)

Although Janz employed this quotation in the quest for the “place” for philosophy, what is 
instructive thereof, is the inherent demystification of the contentious African philosophic 
debates to the effect of oral against written for of philosophy. One could, thus, hold that 
while it may not necessarily be the social context or the written text that confers the label 
“philosophy”, it is not out of place to argue that the three factors of identity, method and 
relevance appears to be essential in the quest for an authentic philosophy of any segment 
of humanity, i.e. Western, Southern, Northern or Eastern.  

Furthermore, the tripartite factors discussed above could be seen as serving as rallying-
point for the various positions argued for by the different discernible senses of 
categorizing African Philosophy. Be it through the forward-looking and the backward-
looking approach to the conception of African Philosophy as noted by Safro Kwame –, or 
through the particularist/universalist distinction of Adeshina Afolayan –; African 
Philosophy could be explained, aptly guided by these three factors. Indeed, a clearer 
understanding is achievable in the conception of African Philosophy via the exploration 
of the intellectual quest inherent in the three factors. One important thing that could also 
be obtained from the consideration of the three factors of identity, method, and relevance 
in the conceptualization of African philosophy is that, the tripartite factor informs the 
interjections ensued in the opinions and postulations of each of the various philosophic 
schools in African Philosophy. It is the observation here, that the quest for identity, 
method and relevance permeates through each of the African philosophic school in their 
varying attempts to argue for what is, or otherwise should count as, 'authentic' African 
Philosophy.  Hence it would be out-of-tune to define African Philosophy in the distinctive 
line of ethnophilosophy/universalism, particularist/universalist, or forward-
looking/backward-looking. Nonetheless, such distinctive approaches should be seen as 
vehicles for carrying home the philosophic message along the line of the tripartite factors 
of identity, method and relevance.

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Conceptualizing African Philosophy in the light of the tripartite factors, is to see it as a 
critical exploration of the social constructions of answers to the existential questions of 
the continent. It is however expected that, answers to the existential questions must be 
proffered in a manner that recognizes the participatory stance of the continent in the 
global arena.  In other words, in this age of globalization with global challenges of crime; 
political instability; scientific and technological advancement; epidemics; environmental 
crisis; to mention a few, it is expected that solutions from any front would have the ability 
to transcend geographical peculiarities. Such ability for ideas to transcend geographical 
particularity is the quest for 'abstraction' and is essential for objectivity . Since all 
abstraction, as argued by Janz is “derivative on the conditions in which ideas form” , the 
factors of identity, methods and relevance conveys the condition of  meaningfulness to 
the intellectual efforts set at dealing with the existential questions of everyday life of 
Africans. Answering such questions objectively requires a reflection that transcends 
social or cultural boundaries and still being able to hold ties to cultural orientations. 

Engaging existential questions, as experienced in Africa,  especially along the line of the 
three factors of identity, method and relevance also shows forth the continental 
consciousness required for the birthing of philosophy. This is against the background of 

thEurocentric worldviews of scholars of the late enlightenment and early 19  century, who 
proposed that Africans and Africa lacks the required quality for philosophizing, namely 
reasoning: Hume ; Kant ,  and Hegel , . This denialability and the response thereof holds 
sway in the philosophical discourse for Africa. However, the legitimacy or quality of 
African Philosophy should not be consequent upon the denial of its existence. Nor should 
responses to such deniability be the preoccupation of the practitioners thereof. This is 
because, to argue for the non-justification of an African oriented reflective and critical 
thoughts due to the phenomenon of colonialism and the deniability of rationality, is to beg 
the question of the rational ability of the people of the Continent. 

Another fact obtainable from the consideration of the tripartite factors is that African 
Philosophy cannot be divorced from the experience of the continent's interactions, be it 
forced or willed, with the outside world. To do that is to put forward an African 
philosophical worldview that is devoid of its existential realities. The question that would 
arise at this juncture would be that: should the raw materials for the development of 
African ideas be necessarily carried over from the outside world? I presume not. Neither 
do I opine that African philosophical stance must not sufficiently be without some form of 
the resultant effect of inter-cultural conversations. This latter point is imperative for the 
development of an authentic African Philosophy, particularly if we consider the 
importance of oral tradition in African indigenous ideas and the relatively late 
commencement of written culture in the continent. There was really no form of written 
African Philosophy before the 1940s, when Father Placide Tempels developed his 
understanding of the Bantu People . The absence of writing draws out the importance of 
oral tradition in African Philosophy, which “contains important elements of critique and 
abstraction which are as philosophical as anything else” . There is, therefore, a need to go 

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beyond the deniability challenge as the crux of the discourse, and to begin to examine the 
interesting and useful ideas that might come from oral traditions, sage individuals, and 
from the academy. While cultural worldviews may be the raw material for intellectual or 
philosophical engagements, they remain at best a particularist cultural orientation, until 
they are made to pass through the crucible of rational enquiry and critical reflection. This 
attitude is open to humanity in general by virtue of the ability to reason, holding for any set 
of persons or culture. Thus, African Philosophy in the attempt to grapple with the nuances 
of the three factors can be definable on a part-whole relationship between operating in a 
particular context-oriented form (subjective), and grounding such operations on a general 
dimension of life realities (objective).

The Objective and Subjective Dimension of Philosophy
It is the position of this research paper that there is a part-whole relationship entrenching 
on the subjective and objective dimension of philosophy. By the subjective dimension, I 
means the contextual components of intellectual resources that informs one's particular 
philosophic view and is based on one's cultural lived experiences. While the objective 
dimension holds for the basic components of life realities that is not peculiar to a 
particular section of humanity but is of general experience of all human creatures and 
cultures. As I would present below, a full grasp of the subjective-objective relationship 
holds a sound enlightenment towards a proper definition of African Philosophy.  

In his 'To be is to be Known', Kwasi Wiredu has been able to note the perplexity involved 
in the bid to define “philosophy” (2004). For him, “there is hardly a single question to 
which there can be said to be an established answer. Here not even on the question what 
philosophy is” (2004, p. 139). To this end it is pertinent to note that philosophy has been 
defined from diverse points of view. One thing derivable from various definitions of 
'philosophy', which would also be instructive to note in my conceptualization of African 
Philosophy, is the relationship between the objective nature of philosophical questions 
and our subjective approach to them. 

The question here should be that: is the subjective approach to defining philosophy or 
addressing any philosophical issue be enough to address such questions? Or would it 
water-down/play down the merit and authenticity of such activities? To hold a positive 
answer to such a quest will be to give in to extreme relativism, which often informs the 
popular view that nobody has said the last word in philosophy. Why this study will not 
give in to such idea is that philosophy can become more than just a subjective opining if 
clear grounds are given for such personal views. On the significance of putting forward 
one's thoughts with clarity, Peter Bodunrin argues: 

When one is putting forward a philosophical thesis, we expect him to state 
the issues at stake as clearly as possible so that we know what we are being 
invited to accept. We expect him to argue for his case – [to] show us why 
we must accept his case . 

What is deducible hence is that whatever the various positions and opinions from 
personal points of view are and whatever importance such views may carry, philosophy 

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Oyekunle                Re-conceptualising African Philosophy As Developmental Tool ...



remains a field of study where rationality and critical analysis remains the core criteria. 

One could thus opine that; it is essential that there should be the interplay of a creative 
analysis of the system of thoughts employs in canonizing any view.  Thus, despite the 
open-ended nature of philosophy, we could identify some ideas that inform what 
philosophy is. I would be considering two ideas of some of the foremost African 
Philosophers. The first is Odera Oruka's conception of philosophy. For him, “Philosophy 
is an art of reasoning and provides a critical intellectual weapon and methodology for 
analyzing and synthesizing the basic problems of man, society and nature” . In other 
words, philosophy is a critical intellectual engagement with the conditions in which 
people live. For him, therefore, philosophy cannot exist ex-nihilo, but it would be the 
creative efforts of thought processes in response to the social conditions (Oruka, 1997, p. 
143). By the understanding of Oruka, all that is needed in defining philosophy is to note it 
as the “intellectual effort to apply concepts and theoretical tools to the benefit of the 
community” 

The other definition of philosophy to be considered, is that of Kwasi Wiredu. For him, 
philosophy is a systematic reflective thinking on life (Wiredu, 2004, p. 1). Earlier, in his 
P h i l o s o p h y  a n d  a n  A f r i c a n  C u l t u r e ,  h e  h a d  n o t e d  t h a t  
“philosophyisarationalandcrit icalreflectiononthemostfundamentalideas 
andprinciplesunderlyingourthoughtabouthumanlifeanditsenvironment,natural and 
supernatural”  . This, for him, is the intellectual orientation that any activity must pass to 
be regard as philosophy. Wiredu(1980, p. 32)also believes that philosophy thrives on 
criticism, and hence the evaluative aspect of the discipline. He claims that without 
argument and clarification, there is strictly no philosophy ,thus, the philosopher argues 
forhisthesis,clarifyinghismeaningandansweringobjections,knownandanticipated 
(Wiredu, 1980, p. 47)

One thing that could be deduced from the consideration of the two scholars presented 
above is that philosophy is an activity that is based on reasoning. As a rational discourse, 
philosophy thrives on the practioners' ability to critically engage with issues, making such 
engagements worthwhile. Another fact deducible from the definitions above is that 
philosophy could as well thrive on the two dimensions, i.e., objectivity and subjectivity. 
While the two authors' views harmonize on the idea of philosophy being a rational 
engagement, their views could however be categorized further on the dimensions of 
objectivity and subjectivity identified above. Oruka's view on philosophy could be seen 
from the subjective stance. In the sense that the reflective thinking on a particular life, be it 
Asian, African or European, in relation with other numerous life forms of humanity as a 
whole could be considered as philosophy along the particularist view. For him, 
philosophy is a response to social conditions, from which such philosophies are generated 
mainly for the benefit of the community. On the other hand, Wiredu's view will be 
categorized as philosophy from the objective stance. However, this research sees 
philosophy from the complementary relationships of these two equal dimensions. In 
other words, it is possible to conceptualize philosophy from the objective dimension as a 

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critical reflection on any life forms that exist. Also, applying such reflective thinking to a 
particular form of life is doing philosophy from the subjective stance.

My view could be said to be strengthened by Gyekye's view that philosophy, being an 
intellectual activity is of a universal [i.e., objective, in my understanding] practice, which 
cannot be confined to a geographical location (1987, p. 9). Recognizing the importance of 
the subjective dimension of philosophy, he noted that “answers to philosophical 
questions provided by thinkers from different cultures may differ in quality [here, though, 
I express reservation], sophistication, and persuasiveness”. –. Furthermore, on the 
relationship between the two distinct but related dimensions of philosophy as recognized 
by this paper, Gyekye has this to say:

When I claim that philosophical activity is universal, I mean simply that 
thinkers from different cultures or philosophical traditions ask similar 
philosophical questions and think deeply about them. It is in terms of the 
philosophical attitude, of the propensity to raise questions relating to the 
fundamental principles underlying human experience and conduct and not 
in terms of the uniformity of doctrinal positions, that philosophy can be 
said to be universal. This approach to certain fundamental questions about 
human experience is, in my view, the common denominator of all 
philosophical activities and doctrines .

While it is necessary to undertake or consider philosophy from the objective prism, it is 
insufficient not to also see it as a strand of subjective application. Here, I agree with Guyo 
that the objective dimension “is the proper dimension upon which we should ground any 
particular philosophy regardless of its origin” . Philosophy from the objective view would 
accord any activity in line with its intellectual orientation as 'philosophy', regardless of 
geographical locations, socio-economic capacities or ethnicity of the people engaging in 
such intellectual activity. This explains why this I sees both the Eurocentric conception of 
rationality with the deniability of African rationality and the ensuing “response debates” 
of such discussions, as intellectually prejudiced and conceptually arrogant. This is 
because any human being may engage in a systematic reflection on life. To hold thus that 
the “philosophical epoch of humanity began first among the Europeans is to undermine 
the vastness of reflective thinking and nothing but sheer intellectual chauvinism” .

My position on the objective dimension is not however oblivious of the fact that such 
reflective thoughts processes can be made to bear along particular conditions of the 
originators of such reflective thinking. In other word, applying or making objective 
conceptions of philosophy to bear upon one's way of life is a subjective dimension of 
philosophy. 

Without any form of contradiction, one would thus be able to hold that rational and 
systematic reflection thus becomes a ground upon which particular philosophy i.e. Asian, 
Western or in the case of our discourse, African, will be able to stand. Also, upon such 
standing would intercultural communication be visible/possible. However, this does not 

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necessarily permit that such philosophy should only hold forth only in the threshold of 
contextual commission. This bias is  further noted by Janz when he argued that 
“philosophy must attend to the conditions in which its question[s] arise… this attention 
does not diminish philosophy's traditional (although never completely fulfilled) striving 
for universals” . Thus, the quest for struggle to contextualize Philosophy in the existential 
question of Africa – even on the earlier explored tripartite challenge – and still maintain 
the abstractness to universality that gave rise to the intellectual dilemma of what African 
Philosophy is.  The word struggle is employed here, because the emergence of 
philosophical discourse in Africa seems to be one that let itself out of the shackles of 
hegemonic enslavement and existential deniability. The denial of African Philosophy has 
itself entrenched in the subtlety of racism. This has also recently been noted as “a denial of 
humanity to Africans” . Thus, the early African scholars see the philosophical journey for 
the continent as the tool for the liberation from the holds of colonialism.

 It thus becomes instructive to hold that a suitable view of philosophy must be one that 
would be based upon the objective stance of rationality and critical reflection, and also be 
able to transcends particularities or its subjective positions. In other words, being able to 
hold ties with cultural orientations even on the plain of objectiveness would adjudge any 
philosophy to be efficient. Also, for anyone to discard the objective dimension, especially 
by arguing that it is a Western orientation of philosophy is to, in my view, be assigning 
only to this segment of humanity the objective dimension and this is “tantamount to 
creeping relativism” which call to question the ability and value of rationality of other 
humans from the non-Western culture . This paper will thus hold that philosophy is a 
critical, rational reflection about life from the objective  dimension without forfeiture of 
the subjective dimensions of one's lived experiences. Philosophy in this view becomes 
something to be practiced and employed for the particular usage of its practitioners. A 
sync of critical activity and subjective participation from individual life's orientations 
such as India, Asia, European or African. Conception of philosophy in this form is 
consequent upon the essence of humanity: rationality. Consequently, it would be logically 
absurd to arrogate exclusive ownership of philosophy to any segment of humanity based 
on material development, colour or race.

It is thus my view that African Philosophy should be seen from the complementary 
relationships of the two equal objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy. To 
reduce philosophy to either of the philosophical strands is to disregard the grasp of the 
part-whole relationship between them. For instance, while it would be right to agree that 
philosophy cannot be done in vacuum and as such will be made to bear on the existential 
realities of the practitioners, to reduce philosophy to such subjective engagements is to 
create an intellectual hegemony for philosophy itself. This appears to be the challenges of 
the response debate in African Philosophy. The debate, good as it may seems to be as the 
particularistic engagement of early African scholars to the forms of life of Africans, 
engages in the reduction of the objective dimension of philosophy to a particular form of 
life and considers it a particular trait reserved for the Africans alone. This, I believe, is a 
reductive exercise that is coloured with the stance of African ethnocentrisms. Thus, 

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cultural orientation, social conditions, particular traditional dispositions are important in 
the creative thought processes of philosophizing. However, not to allow such subjective 
considerations to transcend particularities so as to absorb into the objective ground of 
thoughts is a distortion and negation of philosophy as a critical engagement. On the other 
hand, caution is expected also in transcending subjectivity in order not to universalize a 
particular conceptual idea. This is perceivable in the European discourses of exclusive 
models of rationality. For Guyo, such a worldview is nothing but a “subjective denial of 
objective ground, that struggles to globalize a particular ethnocentric view” .

African Philosophy will be seen as a rational and critical activity done on the objective 
ground without negating its subjective dimensions. For anyone to reject the objective 
ground on the idea that it is a re-echoing of an intellectual style of certain section of 
humanity, is to reduce humanity to that particular section of life. The objective ground of 
philosophy is for any practitioner's, regardless of race or group. To also reduce philosophy 
mainly to the particularistic view of any culture without the rigors of the objective 
dimension is to deny the segment of humanity that such particulars seek to represent, (be 
it Asian, African, European or Indian) the intrinsic traits of humanity. This suggests that 
rationality cannot be an exclusive property of any culture or continent. Thus, philosophy 
of any cultural orientation is essentially expected to be enshrined upon the tenets of 
objectivity—critical, rational and systematic—while still holding ties to its particular 
forms of life.

What this suggests is that it is impossible to detach any philosophy from the practitioners' 
'life-process. The term life-process is employed here tomeans the critical engagement 
with one's immediate environment and the universe as a whole. Such critical grasp, be it 
social,  physical, spiritual, scientific or metaphysical are garnered through the respective 
encounters with various aspects of life which amounts to the gamut of existential realities 
of life. Life-process should be seen to be beyond a people's worldview or opinion, nor to 
be seen in the light of Masolo's concept of “experience” .  Also, Life-process should be 
seen as the vivid canonization of human's confrontation with the complexity of life. Such 
confrontations may be in the form of spirituality, ethical, scientific or mere expression of 
bewilderment. Yet it sparks of a process that is not particular to any race, colour or form; 
But a process that is of a universal phenomenon: hinges on the very essential part of 
humanity; rationality. This is not however oblivious of the fact that such confrontations 
with the complexity of life despite the stance of humanness, are borne out of the various 
correlating factors like, geographical location, cultural or social inclinations. Such 
inclinations make naming life processes along the lines of particularities possible.

It would thus suffice to note that particular philosophies, i.e., Asian philosophy, African 
Philosophy, German philosophy etc., be named along the understanding of life-process. 
This reveals life-process as the medium of philosophical reflections on every aspect of 
human existence. Such reflections are born out of confrontations with everyday human 
life. Thus, to do philosophy without the consideration of life process would amount to 
doing philosophy ex-nihilo. It will be instructive to note that philosophy cannot be 

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detached from the life processes of its practioners; and this is irrespective of the 
nationality, race, colour or material development. It is little wonder, then, that Theophilus 
Okere was of the view that “for philosophy to be African, it must have some expressions 
of the African life” . This also syncs with the Wireduan view that philosophy is a 
symbiotic function of theory and practice, albeit his view that it is theoretical before it is 
practical . This paper thus conceptualises “African Philosophy” as a subjective 
presentation of any practitioner's intellectual endeavour to grapple with the African 
oriented life-process, situated on the objective ground of philosophy. This definition 
suggests that while any philosophy is expected to be subjectively written and based upon 
the life process of the author, such philosophies must be grounded upon the objective 
dimension of philosophy. In other words, I presents African Philosophy as one to be 
understood from the particular African life-process through the objective nature of 
philosophy. To do African Philosophy is to deal with indigenous essential challenges of 
African life-process on the precepts of objective factors like rationality critical reflection 
and ethical standards. As we deal with the particularities of African life-process, such 
engagements would only be philosophy if done in recognition of the basic and 
fundamental nature of philosophy. Indeed, the paper's position syncs with Hountondji's 
view that “the universality of philosophy does not negate its particularity” .

Conclusion
In this paper, the possibility of  an analytical reconceptualization of African philosophy 
have been examined. While conceptualizing African Philosophy on the complementary 
relationship ensuing between the objective and subjective dimension of philosophy, it has 
been argued that only upon the interrelation of such distinctive but related dimensions 
would a proper understanding of African Philosophy be arrived at. This is because, seeing 
African Philosophy in this format – like any other philosophy of any culture of the world – 
will give a stance of engaging the existential challenges of Africa from an objective point 
of view. Thus, considering the existential challenges of our time as one of the examples of 
issues borne out of the lived experiences of people's life-processes that requires 
intellectual engagement, I have been able to make a case for a reconceptualized idea of 
African philosophy. In other words, having and African orientation in the discourse of any 
issue is a practical application of the complementary perspectives of the idea of objective 
and subjective dimensions of philosophy from that African prism. For instance, African 
Political philosophy, or African Development Philosophy will be aptly considered as a 
rational and critical discourse on politics or development from the African parlance. It is, 
thus, in the conception of African Philosophy as a resultant of the complementary 
relationship between objective and subjective dimensions of philosophy even in the quest 
to grapple with the tripartite challenges, that I believe the orientation of African 
discourses on any of the perennial existential challenges of the global world could be 
addresses. To this end I believe reconceptualizing African philosophy in this format opens 
such approach up to further research on the applicability of African philosophy to 
addressing the existential challenges of the global world.

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